end there." 4 Diminished credit harms the real economy because firms need credit to operate and grow and individuals need credit to buy homes and cars and to finance other expensive purchases.
Many think that the story of the credit crunch fundamentally is a banking story.
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Although there is now a severe lack of confidence in banks, the credit crunch predated and contributed to this lack of confidence; although the lack of confidence, in turn, is now making the credit crunch worse.
Securitization and Credit. The credit crunch started with the breakdown of securitization and other financial markets for debt. Securitization is a process whereby consumer financial assets (like mortgage loans, credit card receivables, and automobile loans) and corporate financial assets (like accounts receivable, lease rentals, and licensing fees) are financed through the issuance of debt securities backed by the financial assets.
6
These securities-the most recognizable these days being securities backed by mortgage loans, or "mortgage-backed securities"-are sold to institutional investors in both U.S.
and worldwide capital markets. 7 I will refer, in a broad sense, to capital markets in which securitization and other debt securities are issued and traded as "securitization markets."
Increasingly, corporate and consumer financing is originated not from banks per se or from bank deposits but from securitization markets. This shift-known as "disintermediation," removing banks as intermediaries of funds 8 -can be very efficient. (1994) . 7 Technically, these debt securities are non-recourse debt securities; they are payable primarily from the financial assets backing them. 8 Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 200. Investors in securitization markets may include banks, but they are then acting as ultimate investors, not intermediaries.
By removing the middleman, it removes the middleman's (that is, the banks') profit mark-up.
When securitization markets broke down, however, companies and consumers were deprived of this major source of credit financing. 9 Companies had difficulty borrowing and could not purchase inventory and make capital investments. Consumers had difficulty borrowing and could not purchase homes and automobiles. The lack of credit very directly impacted the real economy.
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This raises two fundamental questions: Why did securitization markets break down, and how should they be protected?
Why Markets Broke Down. Securitization markets broke down due to a systemic cascade of failures initially triggered by the historically unanticipated depth of the fall in housing prices. 11 Mortgage loans to risky borrowers were often made with the expectation of refinancing through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, these borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted.
These "subprime" loan defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of lowinvestment-grade-rated mortgage-backed securities to default and AAA-rated securities to be downgraded. The defaults were especially large for ABS CDO securities-a class of securities backed indirectly by subprime mortgages and other assets-because of the leveraged sensitivity of these securities to underlying mortgage defaults. 9 See, e.g., Mortimer B. Zuckerman, No Time to Lose, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2009, at 80 (observing that securitization "once accounted for 70 percent of our credit while conventional bank lending has dropped to 30 percent. Unless financial firms can securitize debt and, in turn, rely on investors willing to buy [securities representing] the bundled loans, credit will remain extremely tight."). 10 Id. That, in turn, spooked investors who believed that "AAA" meant iron-clad safety and that "investment grade" meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing confidence in ratings and avoiding securitization and other debt securities. Fewer investors meant that the price of these securities started falling. Falling prices meant that firms using these securities as collateral had to mark them to market and put up cash, requiring the sale of more securities, which caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. This death spiral appears to have been made worse by the high leverage of many firms. Encouraged by the earlier liquidity glut, many firms had borrowed excessively because the cost of funds was so cheap.
The refusal in mid-September 2008 of the U.S. government to save Lehman Brothers, and Lehman's resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securitization markets became so spooked that even the highly-conservative asset-backed commercial paper segment virtually shut down. And the market prices of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value-essentially the present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows 12 -of the mortgage loans backing those securities.
13
This collapse in market prices meant that banks and other financial institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their value. That caused these institutions to appear more financially risky, in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk: afraid these institutions might default on their contractual obligations, many parties Symposium on the Subprime Mortgage Crisis), available at http://ssrn/abstract_id=1288687. 12 See Simon Gervais & Steven L. Schwarcz, "Valuation of Risky Cash Flows" (working paper on file with author) (discussing how to calculate the intrinsic value of risky cash flows). The expected value of the underlying cash flows could be estimated, as was done in an English High Court of Justice case involving the Orion Funding SIV in which I served as an expert witness, by examining the mortgage loans backing the securities and ascertaining which were subprime, which were prime, and which were delinquent or in default. 13 Cf. A market liquidity provider with the financial ability to stabilize markets is needed to correct these market failures.
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Operational Mechanics. A market liquidity provider should have the capacity to invest (or, as explained below, to hedge) sufficiently large amounts to stabilize markets and also, if necessary, to wait until final maturity of the securities in which it invests.
Such an entity would likely have to be governmental, 41 although it may well be able to obtain at least partial funding from the private sector.
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There are at least two ways that a market liquidity provider could act. First, it could choose to purchase market securities, at a price deeply discounted from the original market price and also much lower than the estimated intrinsic value of the securities purchased 43 but still high enough to stabilize market prices above the panicked free-fall level. Say, for example, that the intrinsic value of a type of mortgage-backed securities (or "MBS") is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If the market price of 40 [Articulate this also using industrial policy nomenclature, e.g., if government goes big and long enough, it can shift the multiple equilibrium. cite] 41 As a governmental entity, a market liquidity provider would bear at least superficial similarity to the U.S. Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), created in 1989 to clean up the savings and loan (S&L) mess by buying troubled loans. The RTC, however, "is not a perfect parallel for today's needs" for several reasons, including that it was created to clean up the mess years after it occurred, not necessarily (as this chapter also contemplates for a market liquidity provider) to minimize occurrence of the mess. 42 See Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 226-27 (examining how to privatize the role of a market liquidity provider). Cf. infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (proposing that a governmental market liquidity provider could stimulate private investment by entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging). 43 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing intrinsic value).
those securities had fallen significantly below that number, 44 say to 20 cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider could, for example, agree to pay a higher "deferred purchase price" if the securities turn out to be worth more than expected. 45 This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider's purchases. 46 Alternatively, a market liquidity provider could attempt to stabilize the market by entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging-in effect, the market's irrationality element-thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging-and not actually purchasing securities directly-the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less investment risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable. 47 The Obama Administration in the
United States presently appears to be considering this latter type of public-private partnership approach in its revised financial bailout plan.
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44 Because markets normally can fluctuate widely, a market liquidity provider should be careful to act only when the market price of securities is falling significantly below their intrinsic value. 45 In the subprime crisis, some types of MBS securities had become so complex that investors were uncertain how much they were worth. The timing of purchases will be critical. The market liquidity provider should try to act at the outset of a market panic, before market prices collapse too far. Cf. infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (observing that we may already be past a tipping point in the ability of market purchases alone to remedy the problem). On the other hand, the market liquidity provider should be careful not to act when price fluctuations are normal. See supra note 44.
price and still provide a "floor" to how low the market will drop. 53 Buying at a deep discount will mitigate investor moral hazard and also make it likely that the market liquidity provider will be repaid. 54 Furthermore, by focusing on markets, a market liquidity provider can minimize the too-big-to-fail dilemma of a lender of last resort to institutions. This is because, by stabilizing financial markets, the market liquidity provider will minimize the likelihood that institutions invested in those markets will ultimately fail, thereby reducing the times when a lender of last resort would be needed. 55 If in the subprime crisis, for example, the securitization markets had not broken down, institutions like Bear Stearns, AIG, and
Citigroup would not have needed to be bailed out. 56 In economic terms, therefore, any safety-net subsidies created by a marker liquidity provider of last resort will be much smaller than those created by a lender of last resort.
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Funding Illiquidity. A market liquidity provider also could be used to address temporary problems of funding illiquidity. This might occur, for example, when a market 53 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The market liquidity provider, and therefore taxpayers, would profit by buying securities at a much lower price than their intrinsic value. 54 Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 229. Investor moral hazard can be further limited if the market liquidity provider adopts a policy of constructive ambiguity, not stating ex ante whether or not it will attempt to stabilize any given market panic and not indicating in advance the purchase price it would offer if it were to attempt to do so. Id. at 226-27. Investor moral hazard cannot be eliminated, however, because certain markets may be so important that investors can predict their stabilization with a high degree of certainty. 55 [Explain this, possibly keying back to note 40, supra, as a "multiple equilibrium" effect. cite1] 56 Understanding the 'Subprime' Financial Crisis, supra note 11. See also supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (explaining that the collapse in market prices meant that banks and other financial institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their value, causing these institutions to appear more financially risky, in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk and causing the lack of confidence in banks). 57 Cf. Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt, & Kane, supra note 31 (arguing that the goal of financial regulation and supervision is "to manage the [regulatory] safety net so that private risktaking is neither taxed nor subsidized"); id. at 6 (arguing that, ideally, regulated parties should not have opportunities to "shift the deep downside of their risk exposures onto the [regulatory] safety net").
for short-term investments becomes illiquid, threatening to undermine long-term investments that are funded by the short-term investments-such as investments in longterm financial assets, like bonds, funded by short-term asset-backed commercial paper issued by a securitization conduit. 58 In that case, to minimize moral hazard, the market liquidity provider should limit its financing to situations where market participants have reasonably used short-term funding to invest in long-term assets and the subsequent short-term market illiquidity is unexpected. The intent was for a governmental entity to purchase mortgage-backed securities from banks and other financial institutions at a price above the collapsed "market" price but, hopefully, discounted from what the securities are intrinsically worth. This would effectively recapitalize these institutions with more transparently valuable assets (cash).
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The TARP plan, however, ran into immediate political hurdles based on misunderstanding the distinction between market price and intrinsic value. Because the purchase price paid by the government would have to be above "market" to avoid even further counterparty write-offs, there was a populist perception that the government would be unjustifiably bailing out Wall Street. 65 Partly for these reasons, and partly because economists misjudged (in my opinion) the accounting and legal feasibility of purchasing securities directly, 66 TARP money was ultimately used mostly to purchase priority equity interests in troubled financial institutions. If the TARP funds had in fact been used to purchase MBS, as originally contemplated, market prices might have stabilized. 68 If the government were now to attempt to use any remaining TARP funds to purchase MBS, however, it may be a case of "too little, too late." By ignoring the breakdown of securitization markets for so long, the government may already have gone beyond a tipping point in the ability of market purchases alone to correct the problem. This is because the systemic impact of the credit crunch is shrinking the real economy and individuals are losing their jobs, making it more likely that obligors on assets backing even prime securities will default. 69 Stabilization is much easier to achieve at the outset of a market panic, before the panic becomes a selffulfilling prophecy, cutting off credit and cratering the real economy.
This is not to say that even delayed market purchases of securities won't have some salutary effects. Recently, for example, the Obama White House announced that "the Treasury Department will continue to purchase Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities to promote stability and liquidity in the marketplace."
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Similarly, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, also contemplates investing government funds in certain consumer-asset-backed securities to reduce consumer financing costs, although its results are not yet known. 67 Blinder, supra note 63 (arguing that using TARP funds to buy equity in banks, rather than MBS, "wasted a precious resource," and likening such misuse to "another disaster" like the Iraq war and the response to Hurricane Katrina). 68 Cf. supra note 63 and accompanying text (observing that MBS purchases under TARP were intended primarily for minimizing counterparty risk and only secondarily for stabilizing market prices). Practical Concerns. The market-liquidity-provider concept raises several practical concerns. One such concern is whether holders of securities in panicked markets would be willing to sell their securities to a market liquidity provider if, as this chapter contemplates, the price offered is much lower than the intrinsic value of the securities but still much higher than prices in the collapsing market. 71 Some holders, for example, may refuse to sell their securities if they have to mark down value on their financial statements. 72 Some holders may even oppose creation of a market liquidity provider because, even if a given holder does not sell, mark-to-market accounting may require it to mark its securities down to market prices set by the market liquidity provider in its other purchases. 73 These concerns could be addressed, however, by applying (as this chapter contemplates) to those purchases of securities the same flexible pricing approaches used in structured financing transactions to purchase financial assets of uncertain value.
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Failed governmental efforts to try to control their currency exchange rates might raise another concern: whether a market liquidity provider, even if governmental, would have sufficient spending power to stabilize irrationally panicked securitization markets.
Only Hong Kong was able to control its currency exchange rate, and that was because its reserves, which implicitly included all of China's reserves, were large enough to be credible. There are important distinctions, though, between controlling a currency exchange rate and stabilizing irrationally panicked securitization markets. Controlling a currency exchange rate depends on all of the macroeconomic factors to which the country in question is subject whereas stabilizing panicked securitization markets depends mostly on factors specific to the securities in question. Also, because the market liquidity provider should consider acting only when a panicked market is so irrational that the market value of its securities is significantly below their intrinsic value, 75 the market liquidity provider should be able to stem the information asymmetry leading to this valuation differential by explaining the irrationality and, by buying (or hedging) at an 71 above-market price, putting its money where its mouth is. It effectively would be providing to investors in that market the same type of real credibility and comfort that a country's large reserves provide to currency investors.
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A third practical concern is whether purchases by a governmental market liquidity provider could have inflationary effects or expose taxpayers to too much risk. 77 If, for example, a market liquidity provider obtains funds to purchase securities directly or indirectly from the Federal Reserve (or a foreign central bank), the government in effect might be printing money to make the purchases-which could be viewed as a form of "quantitative easing." 78 That in turn could spark inflation. 79 Similarly, if the securities so purchased turn out to be poor investments, the government, and thus taxpayers, would suffer any consequences.
These concerns turn on the quality of the purchases made by the market liquidity provider. If its purchases are fairly priced-a goal I argue is feasible even if the securities 76 Any analogy of the market-liquidity-provider concept to The Bank of Japan's failed attempt to support the Tokyo Stock Exchange's Nikkei index would also be inappropriate. The Nikkei is an index of shares of 225 companies selected to be representative of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as a whole and thus the price of those shares turns on a multitude of macroeconomic factors, including Japan's financial condition. 77 Another practical concern, outside this chapter's scope, is that a market liquidity provider might become ineffective due to political pressures on what assets to buy and how to manage those assets. Cf. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, [cite] (arguing that government-owned asset-management firms, in the U.S. and elsewhere, become ineffective due to political pressure). 78 The term "quantitative easing" is ill defined, but it generally refers to any central bank policy that tries to affect financial markets through approaches other than directly controlling interest rates. . . by the Fed, which amounts to printing money in vast new quantities," which could be "extremely inflationary").
purchased have significant valuation uncertainty 80 -the market liquidity provider, and thus taxpayers, will not lose money on the purchases. In that case, the purchases should not have significant inflationary effects because the market liquidity provider ultimately will be able to repay the central bank. 81 The government, in other words, will merely have made a favorable investment.
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Yet another practical concern is how effective a market liquidity provider would be in a market for securities that are not actively traded. Even without active trading, however, the market liquidity provider should at least set the floor-price standard.
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Furthermore, even non-actively-traded securities are increasingly traded in virtual markets, such as the ABX.HE indices, which mimic active trading.
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Finally, there may be concern whether the very existence of a market liquidity provider could, inadvertently, make falling markets even less stable. For example, parties anticipating market-liquidity-provider stabilization of a falling market might sometimes wait to invest in market securities, even if they believe the securities are undervalued, until they see the price offered by the market liquidity provider. Theoretically this should not occur, but the signal sent by a market liquidity provider might be so strong as to not only set a floor but also a ceiling on the market price. The extent to which this might occur cannot be predicted without empirical data.
International Dimensions. This chapter so far has discussed the concept of a national market liquidity provider. (arguing that without international standards there will be a "race to the bottom" in regulatory schemes).
Given the diversity of approaches to financial regulation and supervision among nations, some commentators believe that any single regulatory model would be impractical. 88 The optimal regulatory model, they argue, must be customized for each country in accord with the structure and size of the country's financial system, its specific regulatory and supervisory objectives, and its unique historical evolution and political traditions. 89 These differences do not, however, appear to undermine the concept of an international market liquidity provider. There is nothing inherently country-specific about stabilizing financial market prices. Furthermore, political scientists and economists have observed that international cooperation is the natural and most effective response of states that share an interest in averting a common crisis that affects them individually-despite the many historical, cultural, and legal differences that distinguish nations. 90 international-market-liquidity-provider capacity. An international market liquidity provider should ideally be able to advance funds in a widely-used international currency, and the Federal Reserve is a source of U.S. dollars. 93 The IMF, in contrast, has no power to create currency. The Federal Reserve also may have an advantage in that it is, arguably, less bureaucratic than the IMF and thus capable of making quicker decisions. 94 Thus, the Federal Reserve (and, by analogy, the European Central Bank) appears to have a better institutional capacity than the IMF to act as an international market liquidity provider.
On the other hand, any national central bank (including the Federal Reserve or European Central Bank) acting as an international market liquidity provider would face possible conflicts of interest between its national and international responsibilities. The IMF, in contrast, is a truly international organization. Furthermore, through its access to member-state capital, the IMF can theoretically spread the burden of responding to international systemic risk. 95 The IMF cannot, however, create currency. It would not need that power if it has access to a potentially unlimited amounts of currency, 96 but such access would require reform of the IMF's relationship with its member-states. 97 There therefore is no clear choice who should act, as among existing institutions, as the international market liquidity provider.
Conclusions. With the rise of disintermediation, financial markets have significantly replaced banks as sources of credit. Financial markets, however, can break down for unexpected reasons. Prescriptive regulation cannot always deter these breakdowns.
Financial markets need a safety net for when prescriptive regulation inevitably fails. Existing governmental safety nets, in the U.S. and abroad, are insufficient because they are structured to protect banks and other financial institutions, not financial markets per se.
This chapter proposes that a market liquidity provider of last resort could function as a safety net, stabilizing irrationally panicked financial markets to avert a systemic downward price spiral. This function should generate relatively minimal costs, and certainly lower costs than generated by existing safety nets which focus on governmental central banks as lenders of last resort to banks and financial institutions. Existing safety nets can foster moral hazard and give rise to significant taxpayer losses when institutions are deemed too big to fail.
I do not propose that existing safety nets be discarded. This chapter's conception of a market liquidity provider of last resort would supplement, not replace, a lender of last resort. The combination, however, would be synergistic: by stabilizing financial markets, a market liquidity provider not only would preserve credit but also would minimize the likelihood that institutions invested in those markets will ultimately failthereby reducing the times when a lender of last resort would be needed.
Finally, I want to emphasize that this chapter's market-liquidity-provider concept does not contemplate indiscriminate purchases of illiquid securities. Such purchases not only would foster moral hazard for parties that sell or invest in those securities, it also would waste taxpayer money on poor investments. This chapter only contemplates the market liquidity provider acting when market prices collapse substantially below the intrinsic value of the securities, as in a panic. 98 In contrast, if prices in the collapsing market accurately reflect intrinsic value, the market should be left to fail. If that failure triggers a panic that happens to cause a more intrinsically sound financial market to collapse or to cause an otherwise-sound financial institution to fail, the market liquidity provider could then decide to protect that sound market, and any applicable lender of last resort could then decide to protect that institution. 
